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DO PROSECUTORS REALLY MATTER?:
A PROPOSAL TO BAN ONE-SIDED
BAIL HEARINGS
Sandra Guerra Thompson*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The inspiring story of Gideon v. Wainwright' gives lawyers and law
students alike the impression that indigent people will be provided with
defense counsel when they are charged with a crime. 2 What few people
realize, however, is that in about half the local jurisdictions in this
country arrested individuals appear at a pivotal hearing-the probable
cause and bail hearing-and face a judge and, in many cases, a
prosecutor but with no defense counsel to speak on their behalf.3 In
those jurisdictions, prosecutors present the government's evidence of
probable cause, and judges make both probable cause and bail
determinations for a person who stands alone before the judge and the
representative for the State.4 What must defendants think of this
proceeding? If they suspect that process is not designed to protect them,
they would be right. One empirical study entitled Do Attorneys Really
Matter? The Empiricaland Legal Casefor the Right of Counsel at Bail
made perfectly clear that people tend not to fare well at hearings where
* Alumnae College Professor of Law and Criminal Justice Institute Director, University of
Houston Law Center; Assistant District Attorney, New York County (1988-90). The author is
indebted to Mon Yin Lung, Associate Director of the O'Quinn Law Library at the University of
Houston Law Center, for her research assistance.
1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. See Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empiricaland Legal Case
for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOzo L. REv. 1719, 1725 (2002).
3. See Douglas L. Colbert, Prosecution Without Representation, 59 BUFF. L. REv. 333, 38486 (2011) (reporting on a national survey of pretrial practices inquiring about the appointment of
counsel at bail hearings). The Supreme Court has yet to recognize a right to counsel at the bail
hearing, although it found that the right to counsel "attached" at that stage, meaning that a court
must not delay unreasonably in assigning counsel after the first appearance. See id. at 334, 383
(addressing the Supreme Court's decision in Rothgery v. Gillespie Cry., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008)).
4. Id. at 334, 347.
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they appear without counsel, as compared to defendants in the same
jurisdiction who had the assistance of counsel.5
The question this Article addresses is the role of the prosecutor in a
hearing where the defendant stands without counsel before the court at a
bail hearing.6 The prosecutor in our system of justice is likened to that of
a "minister of justice."7 But, can a prosecutor "do justice" within the
context of a proceeding that is one-sided in not providing counsel? The
ethics rules, provided in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:
Prosecution and Defense Function, recognize that a relatively small
number of states provide counsel at bail hearings, so there is a variance
in practice, with defendants in many states appearing without counsel.'
The drafters of the Standards thus faced a dilemma in crafting the ethical
guidelines for prosecutors at bail hearings.9 Should prosecutors be
permitted to appear in jurisdictions where counsel does not appear, or
should they be banned? The Standards took the position of preferring
the presence of prosecutors in all cases.1" In cases in which defense
counsel is not present, the choice was made to task prosecutors with
protecting the rights of the unrepresented accused, effectively casting the
prosecutor as a surrogate defense attorney." As such, the prosecutor is
expected to serve as law enforcer and defense attorney at the same time.
This Article examines the various ways that the Prosecution
Function Standards have placed prosecutors in the role of surrogate
defense attorney. 2 Further, this Article argues that time has proven
this approach to protecting the rights of defendants at bail hearings
is unrealistic and that defendants are actually better off if prosecutors
are ethically barred from participating unless defense counsel is
also present.' 3

5. -See Colbert etal., supra note 2, at 1755-56.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See infra Part l.
8.

ABA STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE:

PROSECUTION

AND DEF. FUNCTION,

Standard 3-5.1 (4th ed. 2015). The latest edition of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:
Prosecution andDefense Function is not yet accompanied by commentary from the drafters. See Email from Kevin Scruggs, Criminal Justice Dir., Am. Bar Ass'n, to Sandra Guerra Thompson (Jan.
26, 2016) (on file with author).
9. See infra Part II.
10.

Standard
11.
12.
13.

See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEF. FUNCTION,

3-5. 1(a).
See id Standard 3-5.1.
See infra Part 1I.
See infra Part IV.
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ONE-SIDED PROCEDURES BEGET ONE-SIDED ETHICAL GUIDELINES

Three sets of guidelines regulate the role of prosecutors in the
criminal justice system: Rule 3.8 of the American Bar Association
("ABA") Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the National District
Attorney Association National Prosecution Standards, and the
Prosecution Function Standards.' 4 Of these, only the Prosecution
Function Standards speak specifically to the pretrial stage of the criminal
justice system. 15 The ABA Standardsfor Criminal Justice: Prosecution
and Defense Function, approved by the ABA House of Delegates in
2015, is designed to be "aspirational," by which the drafters mean that
they represent "'best practices.""' 6 By aspirational, the drafters refer to
the conduct of the prosecutors and not the settings in which they find
themselves. In fact, the pretrial bail hearings in many jurisdictions would
strike many non-lawyer Americans as un-American. What television
show or movie ever depicts an American judicial proceeding in which a
person is not represented by counsel and instead faces a magistrate and
prosecutor alone?
Not surprisingly, then, the Prosecution Function Standards cast the
prosecutor in an inquisitorial role-consistent with the idea of being a
"minister of justice"--during the pretrial stage of the process, as it also
does in the investigative process.' 7 In this role, the prosecutor plays a
dual role as law enforcer and protector of a suspect's rights. The rules
envision the prosecutor alone making critical, and generally
unreviewable, charging decisions.' 8 For example, Standard 3-4.4 lists
several factors prosecutors should consider in charging a person, that
call for fairness to the accused such as avoiding disproportionate
punishment due to the imposition of collateral consequences, as well as
an accused's efforts at rehabilitation.' 9 This makes perfect sense for the
investigative stage, before a criminal proceeding has even commenced.

14. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEF. FUNCTION, Standard 3-1.2(b); NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS
intro. (NAT'L DIST. ATrORNEYS ASS'N 2009).
15.

ABA

STANDARDS

FOR

CRIMINAL

JUSTICE:

PROSECUTION

AND

DEF.

FUNCTION,

Standard 3-5.1.
16. Id. Standard 3-1.1(b); Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function-Table
of Contents, A.B.A. (Feb. 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminaljustice/standards/
ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition-TableofContents.html.
17. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEF. FUNCTION,
Standard 3-4.4(a)(v)-(vi).
18. Id. Standard 3-4.4.
19. Id.Standard 3-4.4(a).
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The pretrial process should be different. In this phase, a person
usually has been arrested and taken into custody, giving rise to a need
for defense counsel, but bail hearings take one of three different forms.2"
In many jurisdictions, counsel for the prosecution and the defense
appear. 2 In other jurisdictions, neither prosecutor nor defense counsel
appear, a judicial officer presides without a lawyer for the state or a
lawyer for the defense.22 In a third group, a judicial officer presides and
a prosecutor participates, but no defense counsel is provided.23 A
national study has provided empirical evidence that about half of the
local jurisdictions nationwide do not provide counsel for indigent
defendants at bail hearings.2 4 However, we do not have a breakdown of
how many jurisdictions have prosecutors participating versus those
where a judicial officer presides without participation by either a
prosecutor or defense counsel. The Prosecution Function Standards
recognized the existence of this state of affairs. Thus, the challenge
the drafters faced was to define the role of an ethical prosecutor within
a system that is not fair, at least in those jurisdictions that fail to
provide counsel. The Standards take the position that defendants are
better off if a prosecutor is present at the bail hearing, even if defense
counsel is not.26 On this issue, the Prosecution Function Standards state
unconditionally that "[a] prosecutor should be present at any first
appearance of the accused before a judicial officer, and at any
preliminary hearing."2 7
The reasoning for preferring one-sided hearings appears to be that
prosecutors can be required to take an active role in protecting the
rights of uncounseled defendants, and that this is preferable to a hearing
where neither attorney is present. Before a one-sided hearing takes
place, the Standards task prosecutors with being concerned about the
appointment of counsel prior to the commencement of the bail
hearings.28 Standard 3-5.1(b)(1) calls on prosecutors "at or before the
first appearance" to "consider... whether the accused has counsel, and

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
Standard
26.
27.

See infra text accompanying notes 21-24.
See Colbert et al., supra note 2, at 1723-24.
See id.
Id.
Id.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEF. FUNCTION,
3-5.1(a) (4th ed. 2015).
Id. Standard 3-5.1.
Id. Standard 3-5.1(a).

28. Id. Standard 3-5.1(d).
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if not, whether and when counsel will be made available or waived. 29
Thus, the prosecutor's first job in the pretrial stage is presumably to
take measures to prevent a one-sided hearing by at least "considering"
the accused's need for counsel. The drafters surely recognized the
institutional limitations on the prosecutor's ability to ensure a person
actually has counsel at the bail hearing, so the drafters settled for a
guideline that calls on prosecutors to "consider" the issue.30
The fourth edition of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:
Prosecution and Defense Function, more than the previous editions,
embraces the idea that prosecutors should play a protective role for
defendants at hearings where defense counsel is not provided.3' The
newest edition for the first time acknowledges concerns about mentally
vulnerable people who so often trudge through jails and bail hearings
without defense counsel assistance.32 To address this problem, the
Prosecution Function Standards cast the prosecutor in the role of
surrogate defender for people who may be mentally ill.33 In a separate
set of standards, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pretrial
Release ("Standardsfor PretrialRelease"), the ABA advocates for the
diversion of the mentally ill from jail.34 The Prosecution Function
Standards dovetails with the Standardsfor Pretrial Release by urging
prosecutors to identify people who may suffer from mental illness and
request that they be evaluated.35 When prosecutors find individuals who
appear to be mentally ill, Standard 3-5.1(g) also calls on prosecutors to
"bring those concerns to the attention of defense counsel and, if
necessary, the judicial officer."3 6 Since, presumably, a prosecutor would
attend a bail hearing even when counsel is absent, the prosecutor would
have a greater opportunity to observe the defendant than the defense
attorney who would likely meet with their client at some point after the
bail hearing. Thus, when counsel later becomes involved, the
Prosecution Function Standards contemplate that the prosecutor will
assist defense counsel by informing counsel of his other concerns.37

29. Id. Standard 3-5.1(b)(i).

30. Id.
31.

Id. Standards 3-1.2(b), -3.4(i)-(j), -4.3, -5.1.

32. Id. Standard 3 -5.1(g).
33.
34.
35.
Standard
36.
37.

Id.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standard 10-1.5 (2007).
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEF. FUNCTION,
3-5.1 (b)(ii).
Id. Standard 3-5.1(g).
Id.
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Three other provisions call on prosecutors to act affirmatively on
behalf of an accused. First, Standard 3-5.1(e) requires prosecutors to
assist uncounseled defendants to obtain counsel.38 A prosecutor should
"make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised
of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining counsel, and is given
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel."39 How should this work
in practice? Seemingly, a prosecutor asks the magistrate or the court
clerk to advise the accused of the right to counsel and the procedure to
obtain counsel. A prosecutor is not permitted to speak directly to
uncounseled defendants, so the most a prosecutor can do is to ask others
to assist them.4 °
Second, Standard 3-5.1 (d) calls on the prosecutor to "ask the court
not to engage in substantive proceedings, other than a decision to release
the accused" for defendants who appear without counsel.4 1 It is
interesting that the Prosecution Function Standards use the language
"other than" in this provision. In doing so, the provision recognizes that
42
a bail hearing is a substantive proceeding, which it most certainly is.
The decision that determines whether a person will be detained or
released is for most people the substantive decision that is determinative
of "mostly everything" that follows.43 So, the Standards, bowing to the
status quo in most jurisdictions, acknowledge that bail hearings usually
proceed without defense counsel and put on prosecutors the task of
asking the court not to do anything more than set bail." The Prosecution
Function Standards also explicitly prohibit prosecutors from taking
advantage of uncounseled defendants themselves by obtaining a waiver
of "other important pretrial rights, such as the right to a preliminary
hearing" from an uncounseled person who has not been judicially
authorized to proceed pro se.45
Most importantly, the Prosecution Function Standards now place an
affirmative duty on prosecutors to decide whether they believe a person
should be released pretrial, and, if release is appropriate or the court
orders it, prosecutors should "cooperate in arrangements for release
38. Id. Standard 3-5.1(e).
39. Id.
40. The Prosecution Function Standards make clear that prosecutors should not speak directly
or otherwise "communicate" with an uncounseled defendant absent a valid waiver. Id.
41. Id. Standard 3-5.1(d).
42. Id.
43. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
44.

ABA STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:

PROSECUTION

AND DEF. FUNCTION,

Standard 3-5.1.
45. Id. Standard 3.5-1.
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under the prevailing pretrial release system."46 The Standards for
Pretrial Release favor release of arrestees on their own recognizance
and allow for the imposition of conditions, such as financial conditions,
only when necessary and in the least restrictive manner necessary.4 7
Taken together, the Standards contemplate that prosecutors should
"cooperate" with the courts (whether defense counsel is present or not)
in obtaining pretrial release for all of those people arrested who can be
safely released.48
In these ways, the Prosecution Function Standards place
prosecutors in the odd position of serving as quasi-defense counsel at
bail hearings. They are expected to be solicitous of an uncounseled
person's rights and not seek to obtain a waiver of those rights, to observe
the person for signs of mental illness and take steps to obtain medical
evaluation and release from detention, and to act on the person's behalf
in requesting the court to inform the person of his or her rights, to ask
the court to refrain from conducting substantive business other than
determining bail, and most importantly, to work cooperatively with the
court to get arrestees out of jail whenever appropriate.49 Given the status
quo of one-sided bail hearings, the Prosecution Function Standards
chose to protect the rights of the accused by assigning the defense task to
prosecutors.50 Time has shown prosecutors unwilling-or more likelyinstitutionally incapable of protecting the rights of defendants.
III.

BAIL HEARINGS FAIL TO PROTECT DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO BAIL

Since 1990, as crime rates and arrest rates have both fallen, jail
bookings have increased. 5 Why? The number of people detained pretrial
has skyrocketed. From 1996 to 2014, the number of un-convicted people
46. Id. Standard 3.5-1(f).
47. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standard 10-1.4
(2007).
48. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEF. FUNCTION,
Standard 3-5.1(f); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standard 10-1.4.
49. See id. Standard 3-5.1.
50. See id. Standard 3-5.1(d)-(e).
51. For a discussion of the dramatic drop in crime rates since 1990, see Inimai
M. Chettiar, The Many Causes of America's Decline in Crime, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/the-many-causes-of-americas-declinein-crime/385364. For a chart of total arrests in the United States from 1990 to 2014, see
Arrest Rate for All Offenses in the United States from 1990-2014 (Arrests per 100
People), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/191267/arrest-rate-for-all-offenses-in-the-ussince-1990 (last visited July 24, 2016). For a chart of the number of local jail inmates in the United
States from 1980 to 2013, see Key Statistic: Jail Inmates, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.
gov/index.cfm?ty-kfdetail&iid=489 (last visited July 24, 2016).
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in U.S. jails has increased by fifty-nine percent, accounting for ninetynine percent of the total increase in jail populations.52 Nationally, unconvicted people make up over sixty percent of the total jail population,
totaling almost half a million people.53 In some places, like Harris
County, Texas, pretrial detainees comprise seventy-six percent of the
total jail population.54
Increases in the imposition and the amount of secured commercial
bail bonds account for the rise. Adjusted for inflation, the average
money bail has increased forty-six percent for felony defendants in the
seventeen years from 1992 to 2009. 55 At the same time, the use of
nonfinancial release ("personal release bonds" or release on a person's
own recognizance) has dropped.56 Quite simply, judges have not taken
defendants' ability to pay bail money into account, nor have they taken
into account other factors that may favor a person's pretrial release."
Indeed, they do not seem to understand that the purpose of the bail
hearing-as articulated in the Standards for Pretrial Release and
reflected in state bail laws-is to determine the conditions that would
enable the court to release a person. 58 The law presumes that the person
should be released, and this presumption can only be overcome by
special circumstances.5 9 As the Supreme Court stated in United States v.
52. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 7 (2015), https://www.

whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215 cea fine fee bail issue-brief.pdf.
53. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ BULL. NO. 248629, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014, at 4
tbl.3 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jiml4.pdf.
54.

OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE COORDINATION, HARRIS COUNTY, TEX., JAIL POPULATION

NOVEMBER 2015 REPORT 1 (2015) ("Comparison of Daily Average Jail Population.").
55. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 52, at 6-7.
56. Id. at 6 (reporting a drop from about thirty-nine percent of felony defendants released on
nonfinancial conditions in 1990 to only twenty-five percent in 2008 in the seventy-five largest
counties).
57. See Colbert et al., supra note 2, at 1726-27, 1749 (reporting on a study of Baltimore
courts that do not provide counsel at bail hearings and finding that the courts make decisions
without "verified information about an accused's reliable ties to the community" and "set bail
conditions beyond what the individual can afford"). National statistics about the number of unconvicted people being held in custody for inability to afford bail would further confirm that bail
amounts are set without regard to a person's risk if released and the person's ability to pay a bail
amount. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supranote 52, at 7.
58. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS: PRETRIAL RELEASE, Standard 101.1 (2007).
59. The decision to deny bail and detain a person in custody pretrial must be based on valid
considerations of public safety to satisfy due process. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
755 (1987) (upholding preventive pretrial detention of "arrestees charged with serious felonies who
are found after an adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community
which no condition of release can dispel"); see also PretrialPreventive Detention by State Court,

75 A.L.R.3d art. I § 2[a] (1977).
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Salerno, 60 "[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to

trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception. '61 American states
have recognized the right to be considered for bail since the earliest days
of the Republic, 6 but today's practices seem to have lost sight of this
basic premise and of the presumption of innocence.
In many jurisdictions, magistrates, and prosecutors do not even
recognize the need for an individualized hearing that considers the
ability to pay. 63 Rather, they are guided by "bail schedules," which are

tables that set bail conditions based on the charged offense type and
prior criminal history.' 4 Decisions based on bail schedules create a quick
and predictable process.65 The condition for release is almost always
money bail or the denial of bail outright, and a defendant's ability to pay
is not a factor in money bail amounts.66 The speed with which bail
decisions can be made under this system enables people with financial
means to gain their freedom as expeditiously as possible. 67 A money bail
is set based on the bail schedule, and the defendant's friends or family
pay a fee to a bondsman who arranges the person's release. 68 However,
this system also keeps the poor in jail because it does not allow the
decision-maker to consider other circumstances relevant to the bail
decision, such as actual risk of flight or danger to the community or
ability to pay a financial condition. Traditional bail law requires
consideration of a person's ability to pay any money bail that may be
set.69 Yet, in many jurisdictions, the law is simply not followed.7" Bail
decisions based on a bail schedule, by definition, fail to account for a

60.

481 U.S. 739 (1987).

61.

Id.at 755.

62.

See Andrew D. Leipold, How the PretrialProcess Contributes to Wrongful Convictions,

42 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1123, 1129 (2005).
63.
64.

See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 52, at 7.
Lindsey Carlson, BailSchedules: A Violation of JudicialDiscretion?,CRIM. JUST., Spring

2011, at 12, 13-14.
65. Id. at 14.
66. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 52, at 1; Associated Press, A
California Lawsuit over the Cash Bail System Could Prompt Changes Across the US., L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 26, 2015, 8:49 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/califomia/la-me-bail-bond-lawsuit20151226-story.html.
67. Carlson, supranote 64, at 15.
68. See Lydia D. Johnson, The Politics of the Bail System: What's the Pricefor Freedom?, 17
SCHOLAR 171, 183-84 (2015).
69. Such a requirement is inherent in the Eighth Amendment Excessive Bail Clause for
federal purposes, and most states have similar provisions. See Annotation ]-Eighth Amendment:
Excessive Bail, FINDLAW, http://constitution.fmdlaw.com/amendment8/annotation01.html (last
visited July 24, 2016).

70. Associated Press, supra note 66.
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person's ability to pay, with the consequence that the poor too often sit
in jail while those with money do not.71
The pretrial detention of an arrestee has many unfortunate
consequences. In 1956, Professor Caleb Foote famously wrote, "Pretrial
decisions determine mostly everything."7 2 Research by the Laura and
John Arnold Foundation ("LJAF") has confirmed his findings from sixty
years ago.73 LJAF's studies have found that pretrial detention has serious
negative consequences for people in terms of the criminal justice
outcomes at sentencing.74 In a study of over 60,000 defendants, the
LJAF research showed that people detained pretrial are four times more
likely to be sentenced to jail and three times more likely to be sentenced
to prison than similar people released pretrial.75 Additionally, when jail
or prison time is imposed, people in custody pretrial receive longer
sentences.76 Jail sentences are nearly three times as long, and prison
sentences are more than twice as long for people detained pretrial.7 7
In a separate study, LJAF research made a more startling discovery:
pretrial detention correlates with an increase in recidivism.78 In other
words, "the pretrial phase of the system is actually helping to create new
repeat offenders."7 9 The study examined the recidivism rates of 66,014
defendants considered to present "low risk" if released pretrial,
comparing among them who were released pretrial and those who were
detained and controlling for other known variables.8" The research
summary states, "[t]he study found that when held two to three days,
low-risk defendants were almost forty percent more likely to commit
new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than

71. Johnson, supranote 68, at 196.
72. See Candace McCoy, Caleb Was Right: PretrialDecisions Determine Mostly Everything,
12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 135, 135-37 (2007).
73. See CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL
DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 10 (Laura & John Arnold Found. 2013), http://www.amold

foundation.org/wp-contentl/uploads/2014/02/LAFReport-state-sentencingFNL.pdf.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 3, 10.
76. Id.at 10.
77. Id.
78. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., PRETRIAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 4 (2013),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF-Pretrial-CJ-Research-brief_
FNL.pdf.
79. Id.; see also Leipold, supra note 62, at 1131 n.27 (citing a Bureau of Justice Statistics
study showing that "[s]eventy-seven percent of the defendants who were detained until case
disposition were eventually convicted of some offense, compared to [fifty-five percent] of those
released pending disposition").
80.

LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., supra note 78, at 4.
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twenty-four hours."81 The longer a person was held the greater the
likelihood of recidivism, and similar increases in recidivism were found
for medium-risk defendants. 82 The study cannot explain why people held
in custody, even for only a couple of days, will be more likely to commit
crimes in the future, but it is fair to say that, not surprisingly, jail has a
destabilizing, negative effect on people's lives.
The use of money bonds has become so pervasive and so
destructive that civil rights groups have taken notice, filing civil lawsuits
around the country challenging its use as violating a defendant's equal
protection rights-and they have won." A civil rights group, Equal
Justice Under Law, has filed nine class action lawsuits in seven states,
with its latest in San Francisco, California, the largest jurisdiction to be
challenged to date.84 The group has settled four cases, persuading jails in
some Southern states to eliminate the cash bail system for most
offenses.85 In some cases, state legislatures have enacted sweeping
reform, with legislation in New Jersey and Colorado in 2014,86 and other
jurisdictions making a variety of improvements as well.87 Sixty years
after Foote's pronouncement that the pretrial process was broken,88 some
jurisdictions have finally changed their ways.
IV.

PROSECUTORS ARE THE OPPOSITE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

The Prosecution Function Standards prefer the presence of a
prosecutor at bail hearings to hearings with only judicial officers and
defendants, and they apparently do so for the purpose of having a lawyer
who will intervene on behalf of the defendant.89 Does it work? Does the
presence of prosecutors in the absence of defense attorneys help to
protect the rights of defendants? To date, we do not have a controlled
81.
82.
83.
Ga. filed
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No 4:15-CV-0170, 2016 WL 361612, at "11 (N.D.
Sept. 8, 2015).
See Associated Press, supra note 66.
Id.
See Alexandra Staropoli, Commentary: NJ Ahead of Curve on Bail Reform, COURIER-

POST, (Oct. 18, 2015, 12:11 AM), http://www.courierpostonline.com/story/opinion/readers/2015/10/
18/commentary-nj-ahead-curve-bail-reform/74078306 (discussing bail reform in New Jersey);
NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, AN OVERVIEW OF COLORADO'S PRETRIAL RELEASE

REFORMS 1-2 (2013), http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/CJ/ColoradoPretrialRelease.pdf (addressing
changes made by H.B.12-1236 enacted on May 11, 2013).
87.
88.
89.

See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supranote 86, at 1.
See McCoy, supranote 72, at 135.
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEF. FUNCTION,

Standard 3-5.1 (4th ed. 2015).
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study to determine whether defendants are better off having prosecutors
at bail hearings where defense counsel is absent versus hearings with
neither side represented. Nonetheless, there is reason to doubt that the
presence of prosecutors has either substantive or perceived benefits to
defendants. Indeed, the presence of prosecutors at bail hearings, when
defense counsel is not present, may make matters worse for defendants
both substantively and in terms of defendants' perceptions of fairness.
There is some evidence that the presence of prosecutors has not
improved the pretrial process for poor defendants based on the fact that
pretrial outcomes have deteriorated in the past thirty years, even as the
Prosecution Function Standards have increasingly tasked prosecutors
with pursuing pretrial justice for defendants. 9° In part, it is possible that
prosecutors are not familiar with the pretrial provisions of the
Prosecution Function Standards. Few law school courses would
introduce future prosecutors to these Standards, and few District
Attorney's Offices or CLE programs would teach about this part of
prosecutorial ethics, usually focusing instead on other areas where they
might run into trouble with a court such as discovery or relations with
91
the court and the media.
Moreover, most of the functionaries in the pretrial processmagistrates, jailers, and prosecutors-have probably not considered the
unfairness of locking up people solely on account of poverty, especially
when those people are so often mentally and physically ill (which is
again often a function of poverty as well).92 A more cynical view of the
process is one in which these functionaries, while recognizing the harsh
consequences for the poor, might be motivated by a concern about the
effects that a higher rate of pretrial release would have on court dockets
and prosecutor's conviction rates. Nothing encourages (one might say,
coerces) people to plead guilty like pretrial detention, especially when a
90.

Id; COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supra note 52, at 6-7.

91. A review of the training courses offered by the National Association of District Attorneys
found no upcoming courses offered in neither ethical training nor any category of courses dedicated
specifically to ethical training. See All Upcoming Courses, NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS'N,
http://www.ndaa.org/upcomingcourses.html (last visited July 24, 2016). The Association of
Prosecuting Attorneys offers an upcoming course on "Ethical Issues in Handling a High Profile
Case" but no other ethics course. See Events and Training, ASS'N PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS,
http://www.apainc.org/events-and-training (last visited July 24, 2016); see also Jamien A. Arvie,
ProsecutorialMisconduct: When Justice Is Seen as a Chess Game, the Pawns of Professional
Responsibility and Ethical Standards Are Sacrificed,40 S.U. L. REV. 185, 191 (2012) (noting that
few law schools offer courses on prosecutorial ethics).
92. David Templeton, Evidence Mounting That Poverty Causes Lasting Physical and Mental
Health Problemsfor Children, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 24, 2013, 11:39 PM) http://www.postgazette.com/news/health/2013/11/25/CHILDREN-and-POVERTY/stories/201311250024.
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guilty plea will result in immediate release on "time served."93 The
coercive and depressing effect of being held in jail can also cause even
innocent people to plead guilty94 or to face such obstacles to assisting in
their defense that they are wrongly convicted.95
Foote believed such coercive effects were not intended
consequences but also not exactly unforeseen. 96 Prosecutors may simply
be unfamiliar with the protective role expected of them by the
Prosecution Function Standards, or they may be motivated by
institutional concerns or inertia. Either way, there are reasons to believe
most prosecutors do not see protecting the defendant's rights and
promoting pretrial release as matters of their concern. 97
This is not to say that prosecutors do not view themselves as
"ministers of justice," which they surely do. However, they may view as
primary responsibilities their role protecting victims and keeping the
public safe, as well as obtaining punishment for wrongdoers. They may
view pretrial detention as a helpful tool in obtaining those objectives.
Money bonds are assumed to create incentives for a defendant to return
to court, so cash bail is viewed as a logical tool to prevent a person from
fleeing. 98 Thus, a person with the money to gain freedom is incentivized
to return for fear of incurring a huge financial liability.99 Releasing a
defendant absent a money bond, according to the common reasoning,
provides no incentive for that person to return to court. This logic fails to
take into account that the failure to appear for court will result in the
issuance of a warrant and greater punishment upon re-arrest, which is a
considerable deterrent.)100
93. H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the
Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REv. 63, 84-85 (2011) (addressing prosecutorial overcharging as a
means of coercive plea bargains); see Colbert, supra note 3, at 387-88; see also Stephanos Bibas,
Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126 HARV. L. REv. 150, 155, 164-65
(2012) (discussing the right to counsel in plea negotiations and noting that prosecutors have
incentives topersuade defendants to accept guilty plea offers).
94. Meagan Flynn, Harris County Leads Country in Exonerations Again, HOUS.
PRESS (Feb. 3, 2016, 12:05 PM), http://www.houstonpress.com/news/harris-county-leads-countryin-exonerations-again-8125943; see also Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y.
REV. BOOKs (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-peopleplead-guilty (arguing that the plea bargaining system itself is "one-sided" and noting the
disadvantage faced by defense counsel whose clients are detained on high bail amounts, including
"limited visiting hours and other arduous restrictions imposed by most jails").
95. See Leipold, supra note 62, at 1130.
96. See McCoy, supra note 72, at 138.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 107-10.
98. See McCoy, supra note 72, at 139.
99. Id.
100.

Id.
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If one operates under the traditional logic of a money-based regime,
then it seems rational to require a low money bond for a minor offense,
while a serious offense justifies a high money bond. All defendants are
treated equally when bond is set according to a bail schedule-the same
amount of money will be set on all defendants with the same profile of
charged offense and criminal history, or so the logic goes.
In some cases, prosecutors argue for higher money bonds in cases
they consider more serious, not because they believe that amount of
money will ensure the defendant will return to court but as a means of
pricing a person out of gaining his or her freedom.' 0 ' This, of course,
turns the bail process on its head. Rather than determining the conditions
on which a person may be safely released, the prosecutor, as well as
the judge, may actually seek to determine a bond amount that will
keep a person in custody.1" 2 The detention of over 170 defendants on
$1,000,000 bonds in the Waco biker case is a stark example of this
practice,10 3 but it happens every day in courtrooms around the country.
Preventive detention may in fact be warranted in some cases, but setting
a money bond of any amount is not an effective tool for preventive
detention. The setting of a money bond is a conditional order of release
upon payment, and rich defendants can gain their release even when the
bond is set very high, as was true in the case of the multi-millionaire and
accused murderer, Robert Durst." ° Thus, using high money bonds as a
means of preventive detention exposes the public to risk by allowing
defendants with financial means to be released despite their possible
danger to the community."0 5 The point here, however, is that prosecutors
COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supranote 52, at 1, 7.
102. Id. at 7.
103. See Naomi Martin, Bail Set at $1 Millionfor Waco Biker Gang Shooting Suspects, DALL.
MORNING NEWS (May 18, 2015, 7:01 AM), http://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/2015/05/in-wacoshooting- 192-accused-biker-gang-members-arrested.html.
104. See Polly Mosendz and Reuters, Robert Durst's History of Skipping Bail Comes Back to
Haunt Him, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 23, 2015, 2:16 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/robert-durst-jinxdenied-bail-316108 (noting that in an HBO documentary, The Jinx, Durst is filmed saying $250,000
in bail, which he forfeited when he fled, was "chump change"); Catherine E. Shoichet & Elliott C.
McLaughlin, Robert Durst Denied Bail; New Details Emerge in Case, CNN (Mar. 24, 2015, 4:26
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/23/us/robert-durst-investigation
(showing, in the HBO
documentary, Durst say, "[y]ou can't give someone charged with murder bail because they're going
to run away, of course[,] ... [g]oodbye, $250,000[,] ... [g]oodbye, jail[,]... I'm out").
105. A man accused of murdering his girlfriend in view of her children in Houston, Texas,
gained pretrial release in a matter of hours after his arrest when his family posted a $50,000 bond by
paying a bondsman about ten percent. Within two weeks, the man had been rearrested for allegedly
killing his aunt, who had posted his bail, and shooting his cousin in the head. See Stacy
Morrow, Attorney for Suspect in Willowbrook Mall Shooting to Withdraw from Cases, KHOU
(Feb. 16, 2015, 6:48 PM), http://www.khou.com/story/news/crime/2015/02/16/attorney-for-suspect101.
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have grown accustomed to seeking money bonds on a scale of low to
high according to their intuitions about risks, without necessarily
10 6
considering the implications of this practice.
The presence of prosecutors who may seek prohibitively high
money bonds as a means to attempt preventive detention put political
pressure on judges to agree. According to Chris Flohr, the Director of
the Lawyers at Bail Project in Baltimore, Maryland, when prosecutors
are present at busy bail dockets, they rarely speak out.1 °7 "However,
when they do," says Flohr, "it often puts the judge in a difficult position
because they typically are concerned with a criminal defendant getting
out and doing more harm."'0 8 A judge who disagrees and imposes a bail
amount the person can afford runs the risk that the defendant will in fact
commit a violent act while out on release. 1°9 Says Flohr, "[i]f that does
happen, then someone will look at the record and see that the judge did
not agree with the Prosecutor's recommendation."" 0
The spectacle of a judge and prosecutor deciding a person's
fate-passing on the issue of probable cause and how much money
it will cost to go free-without any attorney there to defend the
person must be disheartening. One-sided bail hearings must lead people
to believe the criminal justice system is stacked against them. One
controlled study gives us some insight on bail hearings with and
without defense attorneys. "' It found that defendants who were provided
counsel at bail hearings (where prosecutors rarely participate) fared
significantly better than a similar group of defendants who are not
provided with counsel.' One interesting aspect of this study, however,
was that defendants who had counsel also reported greater satisfaction
with the process, including a sense that they were treated respectfully
by the judge, and that the judge had considered a great deal of
information in making the bail decision." 3 This stands to reason
since lawyers facilitate communication with a judge, and such
effective communication between an unrepresented person and a judge
does not and should not (for fear of unintentional self-incrimination)

in-willowbrook-mall-shooting-to-withdraw-from-cases/23514247.
106. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, supranote 52, at 7, 8.
107. Email from Chris Flohr to Sandra Guerra Thompson (Feb. 14, 2016) (on file with author).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Colbert et al., supra note 2, at 1749.
112. Id. at 1752-56.
113. Id. at1758-61.
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Having prosecutors at a bail hearing does not improve the
communication between the defendant and the judge, as prosecutors are
ethically barred from speaking directly to an unrepresented defendant.115
At a one-sided hearing with a prosecutor and no defense attorney,
defendants with relevant information for the judge can do one of two
things: either the judge does not hear the defendant's relevant
information, or the defendant attempts to communicate with the judge
directly, often making incriminating statements. 1 6 The presence of
prosecutors at a hearing at which defendants will frequently incriminate
themselves in an attempt to act on their own behalf underscores the
patent unfairness of a one-sided hearing.117
In contrast, a bright-line rule barring prosecutors from bail hearings
in the absence of defense counsel might push jurisdictions in the
direction of providing counsel at bail hearings, which has been shown to
have beneficial effects for defendants and the entire justice system. 8
Moreover, prosecutors' offices will likely provide training for new
prosecutors on ethical mandates (such as the Brady rule) and ethical
prohibitions such as this, whereas other general guidelines outlining
proper considerations may not be taught in training courses.1 19 As a
practical matter, in jurisdictions in which defense counsel is not
provided for indigent defendants at bail hearings, prosecutors will
simply not be assigned to work at those hearings, so there is little risk of
violating the rule.
occur.

V.

CONCLUSION

The idea that prosecutors can act as surrogates in protecting the
pretrial rights of the unrepresented accused has proven to be a fallacy.12 °
The same document cannot pronounce that prosecutors have an
ethical duty to ensure the fair administration of justice and that it is
ethical for prosecutors to participate in a patently unfair hearing. The
ABA would do well to consider amending the Prosecution Function
114. See id. at 1760 ("One advantage of having a lawyer at the bail review hearing is that the
lawyer is the conduit through which information flows to the court.").
115. See supranote 40 and accompanying text.
116. See Colbert et al., supranote 2, at 1726.
117. Id. at 1726-27.
118. See id at 1752-57 (citing a reduced demand for jail bed space as a result of the improved
outcomes for defendants).
119. See, e.g., COMM. ON THE FAIR & ETHICAL ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N
OF THE ST. OF N.Y., THE RIGHT THING 15-17 (2015), http://www.daasny.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/07/2015-Ethics-Handbook.pdf.
120. See supra Part TV.
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Standards. Defendants may be better served at bail hearings where only
a magistrate is present, as compared to one where a magistrate and
a prosecutor are present but defense counsel is absent. Ideally, all
jurisdictions would provide counsel at bail hearings to all defendants, in
which case it would be appropriate for prosecutors to appear as well.
Until then, however, the Prosecution Function Standards should take a
more realistic view of the travesty of one-sided bail hearings and ban
this practice.
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